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1. Introduction 
Germany is often referred to as the latent hegemon that governs Europe. The country 
accounts for 16.10% of the population of the European Union (EU) and 21.2% of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) (Eurostat, 2017). This German presence is equally 
evident in the EU institutions, where the country carries significant voting weight in 
the Council of Ministers and has the highest number of MEPs in the European 
Parliament. Moreover, German nationals hold the greatest number of high ranked 
positions in the European Institutions (World Economic Forum, 2015).  
Despite this weight, this paper argues that such theory cannot stand as the country’s 
role in the EU is more that of a powerful state that drives change in certain areas 
whilst in others, it lacks the necessary means to assert itself. The study has been 
carried out through the analysis of two significant cases in recent European history: 
the Euro crisis and the so-called Refugee crisis, to demonstrate that structural power 
does not always translate into normative power. 
In the first part of this paper, theories of power in International Relations (IR) will be 
analysed in order to evaluate Germany’s power within the EU and to what extent it 
exerts its influence. These theories of power will thus be applied onto two relevant 
case studies: the Euro crisis (from 2010 to 2013), which will specifically evaluate the 
response of Italy and Spain, and secondly, the Refugee crisis (the relevant 
developments of 2015), through the cases of Hungary and Poland. 
This study is particularly relevant for a number of reasons. Firstly, the two crises are 
deeply connected: the southern European countries which were profoundly hit by the 
Euro crisis, turned out to be the most exposed to migration problems, due to their 
geographical position. Moreover, the financial crisis created a gap between the 
Eurozone members and the non-members, who have seen their influence diminishing 
during decision-making processes (for instance, Poland). All these factors contributed 
to the creation of a deeply polarised Europe, with two different blocs: during the 
Eurozone crisis, a creditor group, led by Germany, and a southern, peripheral debtor 
bloc. Conversely, the refugee crisis brought to light a more substantial division 
between the West – led by Germany and invoking a common, European solution – 
and the East, led by the Visegrad Group. Secondly, the role played by Germany in 
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both crises meant a return of the so-called German question. The country’s territorial 
weight, central position and national interests render the country too tied to the rest of 
Europe to remain inactive. In equal measure, any strong activity will be perceived as 
an exercise of dominance and will be blocked by the rest of the Member States (MS).  
The paper is therefore aimed at answering the following research question:  
Given Germany’s response to these crises, can we characterise the country as a 
hegemonic power in Europe? 
To answer this question, the analysis will comprise three sections: the first part 
reviews the existing literature in hegemonic theories as well as theories of power. 
Building on this scholarship, the paper develops a theoretical framework  
firstly, an overview of the European context during the crisis, alongside an 
examination of the internal German situation.   
2. Literature review  
The original purpose of this paper was to conceive the role of Germany in the EU as a 
hegemonic leader. However, as some scholars argue, the word hegemony will not be 
appropriate as the result of the positioning of Germany at the core of the European 
level is the result of its economic power. Some may also argue that its power is 
unintended, and it is more perceived as a responsibility to act.  
A first attempt at defining the concept of hegemony can be drawn by building upon 
the work of Robert Cox’s (1983) effort to compare the work of Gramsci and 
Machiavelli. After exploring the meaning of the Gramscian concept of hegemony, 
which is at times used in IR as synonymous to Imperialism, he identifies hegemonic 
and non-hegemonic periods in history. Such classification consists on a first period 
during which Great Britain was the hegemon, following by a period of instability, 
which led to the two World Wars, considered by Cox as a non-hegemonic period. The 
last hegemonic order sees the US exerting the power. According to Cox, in order to 
become a hegemon, one state would need to find a universally conceived world order, 
namely an order in which states have compatible interests. Thus, according to the 
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author, the hegemon state does not take advantage of the other states within its reach. 
The author continues by explaining how the state that takes up the role of hegemon 
has usually undergone economic and social transformation that have developed their 
political structure and led to extra-boundaries expansion. The author suggests that this 
kind of acquired hegemony is the consequence of such transformation at national 
level, which makes the country become a pattern for emulation abroad (:171). 
Building upon this definition, it would seem the case for Germany after the structural 
reforms occurred after reunification (the so-called Hartz 2003 and Hartz 2010). 
Following Cox’s explanation, which states that the “peripheral countries” have not 
experienced the same kind of reforms and therefore find themselves living a “passive 
revolution”. However, even though economic and social change may constitute a 
model, it does not necessarily convert into a model for other areas. This concept 
provides a good basis to explain why Germany has exerted a certain influence over 
some countries during the Euro crisis but not during the Refugee crisis. Thus, the 
concept of hegemony may not be the most useful tool to answer the research question. 
Conversely, the concept of power has proved more useful to examine the country’s 
role in the EU.  
The concept of power is highly debated in International Relations. Dahl (1957) 
recognises the limits of attempts at defining power, and reaches the conclusion that a 
systematic, single, coherent and consistent Theory of Power is not likely to be 
produced, but different theories with limited scope that can be adapted to a specific 
context. Dahl takes the liberty to use the terms power, influence and control 
interchangeably. His idea of power is intuitive, and it surely is a relation among 
actors, which could be individuals, groups, governments, nation-states, or other 
human aggregates. In this sense, he defines power as a relation in which A has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.  
Dahl states that there must be a time lag between the action of A and B’s response, 
and he continues by saying that there is no action at distance, namely there is no 
power without connection between the two actors. However, as Dahl states, the 
challenge is not to detect the existence of power but to measure it and draw 
comparisons. For the purpose of this study I will not try to compare different power 
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institutions but will concentrate on the recipients, B and C. Thus, A might exercise 
power over B but not over C.  
The most relevant work used for this thesis has been the taxonomy of power 
envisaged by Barnett and Duval (2005). The two scholars argue that the concept of 
power in international politics has been overly oriented towards the traditional realist 
definition of power: the ability of states to use material resources to get others to do 
what they otherwise would not do. Associated with this view, there is a 
conceptualization that is viewed as the only way to understand power: how one state 
uses its material sources to compel another state to do something it does not want to 
do. If the case study focuses on the European Union, a community founded on the 
principle that a war between its MS is “not merely unthinkable, but materially 
impossible" (Schuman, 1950), the concept of material sources used to compel other 
states could be intended as economic means.  
The concept of power has also been thoroughly analysed by other schools of thought: 
there is a neoliberal view, which claims that states with convergent interests create 
institutions and arrangements that effectively tame state power, thus processes of 
social choices are salient and the institutions themselves act as an antidote to power 
(Barnett and Duval, 2005:40). Moreover, they argue that many important international 
outcomes are not the result of the exercise of power but rather the product of shared 
values, economic interdependence, and international institutions. According to 
constructivists, who also reject the idea that power is needed to explain social 
processes, normative structures and processes of learning and persuasion are 
significant to explain social interactions.  
Given the fact that these two lines of thinking reject realism’s emphasis on power and 
try to take distance from such definition of coercion or power seen as military means, 
Barnett and Duval think that they have neglected to elaborate more on how power is 
conceptualised and operates with their theories. Indeed, it is true that neoliberals 
highlight how institutions produce cooperation, but they could also emphasize how 
institutions help shaping the bargaining advantage of actors, control asymmetries and 
establish parameters for change that benefit some at the expense of the others. Thus, 
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by distancing themselves from the traditional use of realist concept of power - 
because of the negative meaning of power as means of coercion and military means -  
Neoliberal scholars have neglected to explore different nuances of such concept. The 
starting point for the two authors is to define power as the production – through social 
relations- of particular kinds of effects, namely those capable of shaping the existence 
and fate of one particular actor. The conceptualization of power that derives from this 
definition entails two dimensions for those social relations: the kinds of social 
relations that affect actors’ capacities, which can occur through interaction or 
constitution, and the characteristics of those social relations, which could be specific 
or diffuse. From this interaction, a fourfold taxonomy of power is obtained: 
compulsory, institutional, structural and productive.   1
After analysing theories of power, the research focus has been moved to analyse how 
previous scholars have discussed the role of Germany within Europe.  
In the work of Sperling (2001), the attention is drawn upon the debate that arose after 
German reunification: a too big Germany could be a problem even for an 
institutionalised Europe. Nonetheless, the author highlighted that Germany’s position 
of dominance was treated as axiomatic and a result of its belligerent modern history, 
even though there was unwillingness from the country to exert that power. Sperling 
treats Germany as a significant power that lacks the structure necessary to become 
and hegemon, and places the obsession with German “latent hegemony” as a result of 
disastrous Nazi period.  The dilemma is: why has Germany not exercised political 
power commensurate with its economic power? (Sperling, 2001: 394) 
More recent authors such as Jonathan Story (2017) point to the fact that a significant 
break with the status of a post-war weakened state came in 2002, when Germany 
refused to give its support and logistics to the Iraqi war, where Germany decided to 
distance itself from France. This can be considered as a first demonstration of 
Germany’s attempt of assertion after reunification and normalization of the state. 
However, the constructivists argue that that decision was a further proof of 
 Barnett and Duval underline the fact that scholars should not focus on the recognition of one concept 1
of power in a specific situation, but rather on the fact that multiple concepts enable or constrain actors 
in different situation. 
!  7
commitment to antimilitarism, a concept that has governed the country’s rhetoric after 
the Second World War (WWII). Thus the original concept of power in an anarchic 
world as intended by the realists does not stand, as the country did not pursue an 
aggressive foreign policy either.  
Another breaking point can be seen in Germany’s role played during the Ukrainian 
conflict, which sees for the first time the country taking up a leadership role in foreign 
policy issues after WWII. By a systematic condemn of Russian actions, Merkel gave 
an important contribution to the negotiations which led to the signing of Minsk II in 
February 2015 , and Germany positioned itself as a pioneer in the design of the 2
punitive sanctions against Russia, even if its impact on Russian behaviour was 
limited. This experience also showed that an active German role in “high politics” and 
international issues is necessary to help enhancing Europe’s role as a bloc (U. Krotz, 
J. Schild, 2017:69).  
Besides external policy actions in the case of the Russian sanctions, the literature on 
Germany has flourished during the Euro crisis, where scholars seem to agree on the 
fact that Germany had demonstrated willingness to take the lead and exert power. 
Germany’s structural economic power has indeed influenced its behaviour towards 
other Eurozone countries, and there seems to be consensus at the academic level on 
the fact that the ordoliberal strategy  has been used. An interesting point of view on 3
the way the crisis was handled is offered in the article “Eurozone crisis: beggar thyself 
and thy neighbour” by scholars Lapavitsas, Kaltenbrunner, Lindo, Michell, Painceira, 
Pires, Powell, Stenfors, and Teles (2010). In their view, the Euro crisis was the result 
of a fundamental structural bias of elites in the Eurozone for which austerity measures 
 Protests carried by pro-Russian and anti-government forces in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions of 2
Ukraine broke out in February 2014. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, 
Ukranian forces went on the offensive and started an armed conflict which went on until September of 
the same year, when the belligerent signed the first Minsk Protocol. The deal failed to solve the 
situation and the conflict erupted again. Germany and France stepped in and made effort to bring both 
parties to the negotiating table, which led to the immediate ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions of Ukraine agreed in Minsk and signed by Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany.  
 
 Scholars recognize the ordoliberal thinking in three major points: the attention to principles and rules; 3
prevalence of microeconomics and supply side; bias towards long-term measures.
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coupled with liberalisation might lead to stagnation in the short term but will deliver 
stability in the long run (: 53). This was the preferred strategy adopted by German 
political elites after the reunification, which led to a mediocre economic performance 
for many years whilst putting pressure on German workers’ wages; the country’s 
accumulated current account surplus had then been reutilized through foreign direct 
investments and German banks lending to peripheral countries, which has given the 
country’s significant leeway in the Euro crisis decision making, through the notion 
that “what worked for Germany will work for other European countries”.  
German sociologist Ulrich Beck goes further by stating that such view is not only the 
result of pragmatism and willingness to impose a national pattern on other countries, 
but it is also based on underlying values (austerity over profligacy), so much that the 
country itself does not see its role as “an exercise of power” but rather a responsibility 
to act (Beck, 2013: 25). Such concept can be extended to explain Chancellor Merkel 
behaviour in the refugee crisis: providing moral leadership to project of an image of 
Germany as a productive power. 
  
3. Theoretical framework & Methodology  
As mentioned in the literature review, the model introduced by Barnett and Duval, 
which is inspired by the early work of Dahl, provides a suitable theoretical framework 
for the analysis. This approach is chosen amongst others because it provides with a 
better analysis of how such effects work to the advantage of some and the 
disadvantage of others. Compulsory power has been ruled out from this paper, while 
institutional, structural and productive have been used to examine Germany’s role 
during the two crises. At first, it may seem that the most correct definition for 
Germany would be that of institutional power. Indeed, despite the institutional 
constraints, Germany enjoys a large amount of institutional power within the EU, as 
the rules constrain action but the institutional setting gives it significant leeway to 
shape the agenda .  4
 As mentioned above, due to its population and GDP, the country carries significant voting weight in 4
the Council, and has the highest number of MEPs in the European Parliament. Moreover, 4 out of 7 
Political Party Groups have a German national as leader/chairman. 
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However, Barnett and Duvall state that such power comes from the fact that an actor 
A stands in a particular relation relevant to the institutional settings and not from 
possessing resources of power (2005:51). In the case of Germany, relevance comes 
from both the institutional setting and from possessing resources of power, in this case 
economic “structures” that allocate differential capacities and thus differential 
advantages to different positions (2005:53). Thus, possessing certain structures 
provides certain actors with a privilege that often leaves them “no choice but 
accepting their role in the order of things” (2005:53), thus accepting their 
responsibility to act. The definition of structural power proves useful to analyse 
Germany’s role in the Eurozone crisis, and it can be even used to explain Germany’s 
perceived self-responsibility to act over the Refugee crisis (because of its economic 
status in comparison to other countries in need. However, Germany’s attempt to 
influence outcomes in migration affairs could be better explained through the use of 
productive power: while structural power relies on direct structural relations (in this 
case, the need of financial assistance), the latter entails more diffuse social processes 
and aims at producing a certain term of action (Barnett and Duvall, 2005:56). 
Therefore, this paper is guided by the hypothesis that Germany possesses the 
resources to exert structural power in certain issues (economic and monetary policies) 
and will examine whether this translate into productive power in different type of 
issues (justice and home affairs). The results will be analysed in order to evaluate 
whether this is enough to characterise the country as a hegemonic power in Europe. 
In terms of methodology, this work aims at providing the audience with a comparative 
case study on the two crises, built on process tracing: the aim is to first prove the 
exertion of German power in one crisis and the other one to prove the lack of it. In 
order to demonstrate this, national official documents, government press releases from 
Italy, Spain, Hungary, Poland as well as official EU documents such as 
Communications, Recommendations, Regulations, Decisions and Resolutions have 
been analysed. Moreover, newspaper pieces to reconstruct timeline have been an 
important part of the research.  
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Primary and secondary sources have been consistently used in order to give an 
overview of the existing theoretical framework on power and adapting it to the current 
affairs. This methodology is particularly useful for understanding how the context can 
influence the success of an intervention. 
“Never waste the opportunity offered by a good crisis” 
Niccolò Machiavelli  
4. Case 1: The Eurozone crisis 
4.1: The context – Germany after reunification  
Before exploring the attempt by Germany to shape the response of EU countries 
during the Eurozone crisis, it is important to state that at its inception, the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) was a project intended to constrain Germany, not to 
enhance its power. When the common currency was introduced, the financial crisis 
could not be foreseen (Garton Ash, 2017). 
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The so-called German Question has returned into the discussion in 2008. The high 
costs of reunification, which led to demographic change, and rise of the 
unemployment level, coupled with global competition had put significant strain in the 
generous German welfare state in the first decade of the 21st century. Furthermore, 
Germany had to abide to the limits on deficit imposed by the Stability and Growth 
pact not to exceed 3% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), which 
prevented the government from furthering the spending in order to stimulate growth 
and employment (At this point, it is worth noting that Germany, along with France 
had already breached the so-called Maastricht criteria in 2003). 
In March 2003, the coalition led by the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
inaugurated a set of reforms known as the “Agenda 2010” or the Hartz reforms , 5
which, amongst other provisions, included a significant cut in unemployment benefits, 
an overall ease of the conditions to hire and fire workers, a reduction of health 
insurance coverage, and a rise in the retirement age. Such structural reforms were 
aimed at changing the status of the so-called “sick man of the euro”(The Economist, 
1999). By promoting the changes, Chancellor Gerard Schroeder marked a dramatic 
change in the direction of the SPD, urging Germans to take “individual responsibility 
in contributing to the share of the state” (Camerra Rowe, 2004).  
The fact that a social-democratic government pushed these types of reforms reflects 
that the Protestant work ethic is deeply rooted in Germans’ opinion. Suffering 
purifies, and the road through austerity will bring economic prosperity (Beck, 2013).  6
Nonetheless, the labour reforms pushed by Schroeder had been perceived as a 
neoliberal shift of the government at the expense of the working class, which resulted 
in the defeat of the SPD-Green Coalition at the national elections of 2005. The 
socialist government was replaced in 2005 by the grand coalition of the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democrats under the leadership of Angela 
Merkel, whose main goal was to reduce the public debt. 
 From the name of the commission led by Peter Hartz, responsible for the reform of the German labor 5
market.
 According to the work of S. George of 2000 on Britain and the Eurosceptic nature of the county, the 6
factors that determine the position taken up by a country are a complex of the personal prejudices, 
preferences and perceptions of the ruling elite. See “Britain: anatomy of a Eurosceptic state”.
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4.2: Germany and the Eurozone crisis 
Arguably, the Hartz agenda was the forerunner of the austerity measures, the long-
advocated solution to the debt crisis according to Chancellor Merkel, because to the 
eyes of Germans, austerity contributed to the country’s economic post-war revival. 
Coupled with the results that the Hartz Agenda was bringing, and helped by its 
traditional economy oriented towards exports rather than dependent on the internal 
demand, the crisis of 2008 did not hit Germany as hard as its European neighbours. 
While the southern countries experienced the economic boom after the introduction of 
the euro, with a consequent rise of the labour costs and inflation, Germany was 
gaining competitiveness by keeping inflation and remuneration of workers generally 
low. This in turn generated persistent current account surpluses, which were soon to 
become foreign direct investment and bank lending to the Eurozone countries. 
With the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, the perception of Germany in Europe 
changed from tamed power to dominant player in the EU (Hillebrand, 2015). 
Germany acquired economic power, which as Beck states, is more mobile and differs 
from military power in the sense that it can be exerted in different manners – therefore 
“it has no need to invade and yet is ubiquitous” (Beck, 2013: 165). As mentioned 
before, there is consensus among scholars that the ordoliberal way advocated by 
Germany was the only effective solution to the crisis: critics of short-term measures, 
conditionality of loans on structural reforms and push for reforming the institutional 
Eurozone framework.  
In this context it is worth noting that a Eurozone governance reform with a much 
stricter fiscal discipline was also sought by France. In a pre-EU summit held in 
Deauville on 18 October of 2010 Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy issued a 
highly controversial declaration, which stated the need for more automatic sanctions 
for those MS in breach of the budgetary rules, and interestingly enough, it proposed 
that such sanctions were to be imposed by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the 
Council. Moreover, the case of a MS affected by significant imbalance would have to 
be discussed in the European Council (the normal procedure implies that the EC is in 
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charge of surveillance and launch of infringement procedures ). The declaration goes 7
further by suggesting a “surgical” revision of the Treaties, with a proposal to be made 
before the EU summit of March 2011. Lastly, the declaration envisaged the 
suspension of voting rights in the Council in case a MS performed a severe violation 
of the SGP. Although the proposal did not have an impact and was later on defined as 
“dormant”, it shows an important swift in German policy towards integration: an 
intergovernmental solution rather than supranational, usually advocated by the 
Berlin.  This theory seems to be confirmed by the famous speech which the 8
chancellor held in Bruges just a few days later, on the 2nd of November 2010. Merkel 
began by praising the important role that European integration played for German 
reunification, acknowledging the great trust placed in the Germans by Europe – a trust 
that the reunified Germany intended to keep living up to. The most interesting part 
follows: “As Germany is Europe’s largest economy, it has a particular responsibility 
for our continent… This is why I have decided to request my Parliament, the German 
Bundestag, to take unusual and previously unimagined routes in order to help Greece 
and thus to ensure the stability of the Eurozone as a whole […] I believe it was the 
right thing, but I also have to insist that countries which caused such a crisis will have 
to take action themselves in the future […]”. Thus, in the first part of the speech she 
endorses her country with the responsibility to solve the crisis, de facto recognising its 
leadership. The second part of the speech also explores the “ordoliberal German 
solution” to the crisis and it is characterised by the recurrence of words such as a 
“culture of stability”, “individual responsibility”, “and long-term measures”  over 9
short-term solutions. The last part of her speech is probably the most significant, and 
the most alarming according to commentators, since she struck the limitations of the 
 Art. 258 TFEU gives the power to the EC to issue an opinion in case a MS fails to fulfill an obligation 7
under the Treaties.
 During the press conference in Deauville, Sarkozy and Merkel suggest the introduction of QMV in 8
the European Council itself, which it currently votes by unanimity, namely a veto of one state can 
block the decision-making process. France has usually supported an intergovernmental concept of 
integration, while Germany was traditionally willing to see a stronger role for the supranational 
institutions. 
 Not only structural reforms for the countries affected, but also reforming the economic governance of 9
the Eurozone; the “limited Treaty amendment” which she refers to is the one agreed on the 28/29 
October 2010 EU summit where the heads of state and government agreed to set up a permanent crisis 
mechanism to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area. 
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“community method”, attacking the EP and the EC for seeing themselves as the sole 
defenders of the EU against the intergovernmental method used by MS and in the 
other EU institutions such as the European Council and the Council. “A coordinated 
European position can be arrived at not just by applying the community method; 
sometimes a coordinated European position can be arrived at by applying the 
intergovernmental method […] coordinated action in a spirit of solidarity – each of us 
in the area for which we are responsible but all working towards the same goal. That 
for me is the new “Union method” (Merkel, 2010).  
Although its European neighbours might perceive this as a way to exert power, in 
most cases this attitude is the result of a strategy aimed at preserving political 
consensus at home as well as getting re-elected and tackling the emerging rise of 
populism.  At the same time, it was important to calm the spirit of German taxpayers 10
who might feel exploited by the “profligacy of debtor countries”, as the media had 
portrayed it. As Streeck recognised in his work, the German government had 
successfully equated the monetary union with the European idea or even with Europe 
itself. Merkel’s severe “If the euro fails, Europe too will fail” is still regarded by 
everyone as the formula for national consensus. Since it is beyond debate in Germany, 
that national policy must be European, this makes the defence of the euro at any price 
not only of economic pragmatism but also of German political and moral raison d’état 
(Streeck, 2015). Nonetheless, a more aggressive Germany has emerged from the Euro 
crisis; not only must peripheral countries play by the rules, they also need to respect 
German “guidelines”. This went further than seeking a Eurozone governance reform 
and imposing austerity measures, to the extent that Germany began externalizing the 
debate and pressuring EU countries to enshrine budgetary discipline in their 
Constitutions in order to avoid future fiscal profligacy. Indeed, in August 2009, 
German lawmakers incorporated a so-called “debt brake law” (in German, 
Schuldenbremse) in the German Constitution or Basic Law that would prevent the 
federal government from running a deficit of more than 0.35 per cent of GDP by 
2016. Moreover, German states were not allowed to run any deficit after 2020 
 The party Alternative for Germany (AfD) was founded in 2013 as a platform for those who had 10
opposed Germany’s rescue policies. 
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(Schafer, Hall, 2010). The following section of the paper will analyse the case of two 
EU MS, Italy and Spain, which both passed laws to enshrine budgetary stability in 
their Constitutions in September 2011.  
  
The most significant influence over the two countries can be seen in their insertion of 
the debt brake law, also known as the “golden rule” in their Constitutions prior to the 
Fiscal Compact signed in March 2012. Indeed already in 2010, the Germans intended 
to put pressure on the other Eurozone partners to adopt balanced budget law into their 
national legislation as a part of “sweeping reforms to stabilise the euro”(Financial 
Times, 16/05/2010). The main argument of this part of the paper is that Italy and 
Spain did so in exchange for regaining their credibility in the markets, which was 
severely hit (for different reasons) in the summer of 2011.  
4.3: The case of Italy  
In order to check whether there was a behavioural change in the Italian government 
during the years of the euro-zone crisis, the period of 2011 and 2012 - when the crisis 
hit the country and the democratically elected centre-right government led by Silvio 
Berlusconi lost the majority- will be analysed.  
As the third economy in the euro-zone, when the difference in yields between Italian 
and German benchmark bonds widened sharply (known in Italy as the “spread”) the 
level of anxiety amongst European institutions was high. The centre-right government 
led by Berlusconi since 2008, had made some efforts to introduce austerity measures 
aimed at achieving budgetary discipline: for instance the government intervened in 
the area of structural reforms such as a broad simplification of administrative 
procedures and a renovation of the apprenticeship system (Goretti, Landi, 2013). 
Furthermore, in the second half of 2011, three budget laws containing a mixture of 
spending cuts and tax increases were approved. Der Spiegel reported that an Italian 
commitment to austerity was the key to implementing the plan.  
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Nonetheless, there was a widespread sentiment that Berlusconi’s government was not 
doing enough to bring budgetary discipline to his country, unless “bullied”. 
Newspapers reported about an alleged telephone call from the German chancellor, 
Angela Merkel to Italian President Giorgio Napolitano, de facto violating the 
Europe’s leaders’ unwritten rule of non-intervention one another’s domestic policy 
(Wall Street Journal 2011). Accordingly, President Napolitano was asked to find a 
suitable replacement for a government deemed incapable of reforming the country.  
On the 5th of August, President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Jean Claude 
Trichet and his designated successor, governor of Italian Central Bank Mario Draghi 
sent a letter to the Berlusconi government, requesting urgent action by the Italian 
authorities in order to restore the confidence of investors. The ECB demanded an 
extensive action on measures to promote growth, a full liberalisation of local public 
services, a labour market reform and a separate legislation to balance the budget by 
2013 – a year earlier than the executive had planned. The last part of the letter is 
particularly significant as the ECB instructed the Italian government with a clear 
modus operandi to follow: “In view of the severity of the current financial market 
situation, we regard as crucial that all actions listed above be taken as soon as possible 
with decree-laws, followed by Parliamentary ratification by end September 2011. A 
constitutional reform tightening fiscal rules would also be appropriate” (ECB, 2011) 
PM Berlusconi and Economics and Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti held a press 
conference on the same day, in which they expressed their commitment towards the 
ECB’s plan. Moreover, Minister Tremonti said:” The government will cooperate 
closely with the Parliament in order to introduce the balance-budget amendment in 
our Constitution as soon as possible. This is a historical moment for Italy”.   11
The Council of Ministers submitted the first proposal for a constitutional law 
amendment to insert the debt brake law on the 8th of September. However, despite the 
country’s commitment to reforms, the anxiety over Italy’s fiscal stability continued to 
rise and the government was forced to pass two bills aimed at reducing public debt by 
 Press conference available at http://video.repubblica.it/dossier/crisi-italia-2011/berlusconi-pareggio-11
di-bilancio-anticipato-al-2013/73877?video
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45, 5 billion within two years. Nonetheless, on the 20th of September the Agency 
Standard and Poor downgraded Italy to A-1, mainly because they deemed the “fragile 
governing coalition and policy differences within parliament likely to continue to 
limit the government's ability to respond decisively to the challenging domestic and 
external macroeconomic environment”. In October, Italy’s rating was further 
downgraded by Moody’s agency for the first time in two decades.  
 On the 11th of October 2011, the Italian Court of Auditors criticized the fiscal reform 
agreed in August; the Rendiconto Generale dello Stato  was rejected in the Chamber 12
of Deputies,  another proof of the fact that PM Berlusconi was losing the majority. 13
The event had been interpreted as a negative judgement on the Government’s 
approach to the Euro crisis (Petrini, 2011). Berlusconi was not yet ready to surrender 
and decided to hold another confidence vote a few days later, where he managed to 
save the coalition government from collapse by obtaining 316 yes against 301 no. Not 
only domestically, but also at international level Berlusconi seemed to have lost its 
credibility to save Italy from the crisis. In a joint press conference prior to the G20 
summit, Merkel and Sarkozy laughed at the idea of the Italian PM to be trusted with 
the implementation of the necessary reforms.   14
The Chamber of Deputies gathered again on the 8th of November to approve the 
“Rendiconto Dello Stato (previously rejected in October). Finally, the law was 
approved with 308 votes; however, it became clear that the current government had 
lost the majority, thus PM Berlusconi held a meeting with President Napolitano. The 
press release of the same night stated that the PM understood the implications of what 
happened in the Chamber of Deputies. “Nonetheless, considering the need to provide 
the EU with concrete answers, the executive will resign after the Senate passes a set 
of urgent reforms”(La Repubblica, 2011). One day later, former Commissioner for 
 The Rendiconto is a constitutional obligation in art. 81, through which the Govenrment must update 12
the Parliament on the results obtained by the financial management. 
 The vote ended 290/290, despite the great representation of the Government in the Parliament. For 13
its approval, 291 votes were needed. 
 http://video-.corriere.it/sarkozy-merkel- ridacchiano-berlusconi/c9d7baf0-fd9b-1-1e0-aa26- 14
262e7-0cd401e  
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Competition and Internal Market Mario Monti was appointed Senator for Life by 
President Napolitano. 
Berlusconi officially presented his resignation on the 12th of November; on the same 
day, Monti was invited by Napolitano to form a technocratic government to guide 
Italy towards economic recovery. Monti was considered a high-profile economist at 
international level, which could also explain why he was overall supported by the 
Italian electorate, exasperated by the scandals in which Berlusconi’s party was 
involved. In an article written for the Financial Times in 2010, when the Greek and 
Irish crises were at their peak, Monti warned about the “priority to short-term interests 
at the expense of sustainable discipline” (Monti, 2010) in a clear ordoliberal 
standpoint. Indeed, Monti was a long-supporter of Germany’s austerity policies. 
Earlier in August 2011, he wrote an editorial for the Italian newspaper Corriere della 
Sera, commenting on the decree passed by the centre-right government after the ECB 
letter. Considering the interlink between the Eurozone, he advocated in favour of a 
technical government, with various locations in Brussels, Berlin and Paris: “the EU 
and the Eurozone are going through a rough patch, and they will have to deeply 
reconsider their strategies. They will need to come up with instruments capable of 
reinforcing budgetary discipline, fairly advocated by Germany in the interests of 
everyone. At the same time growth needs to be favoured, even in Germany’s own 
interests – because if the rest of the Eurozone falls, so will Germany. A well-respected 
Italy will be of great help for Europe as a whole” (Monti, 2010). 
At the beginning of his mandate, not only was Monti enjoying popular support, but 
also his cabinet confidence’s vote held on 17th and 18th November gained an 
overwhelming majority in both Chambers. During the ceremony, Monti revealed his 
plan, which was to be based on “austerity, growth and equity”. Monti’s technocratic 
government passed short-term austerity packages (such as tax increases, liberalization 
and deregulation measures) aimed at meeting EU targets as soon as possible, as well 
as long-term structural reforms. Monti’s attitude was warmly welcomed by 
Chancellor Merkel: complying with the EU economic rules without incurring in the 
need of financial assistance (Bastasin, 2015: 345).  
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The first package - the Decreto Salva Italia (Decree Save Italy), whose aim was 
balancing the budget by 2013 comprised controversial measures such the plan to rise 
retirement age at 67, which Germany had already undertaken before 2010.  
The other main objective of Monti was reforming the labour market. In the spirit of 
the German Hartz reforms, the Italian government tried to shift the rigid Italian two-
tier labour market towards a “flexicurity” model. In line with the ordoliberal German 
thinking, Monti’s government advocated the need to soften worker’s protections in 
order to increase competitiveness.   
The general view is that Monti had not been a real reformist but rather an emulator of 
Germany, whose economic success was based both on structural reforms and its 
austerity policies (Casertano, 2012).   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
4.4: The case of Spain 
  
After entering the euro, Spain had successfully reduced the unemployment rate to 8, 
1% , in line to the German amount. However, when the Lehman brothers fell in 15
September 2008, the unemployment rate in Spain grew of two digits. 
Nowadays, there seems to be consensus over the causes that have led to the Spanish 
recession: most scholars attribute it to the excessive credit growth after joining the 
Eurozone, supported by expansionary monetary policies of the ECB.  
Spain had entered the XXI century suffering from “an illness without fever, whose 
symptoms did not seem so serious to the eyes of the doctor”(De Juan, Uria, De 
Barrón, 2013). The re-elected left-wing government led by José Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero also failed to recognise that illness so much that in August he stated: “the 
Spanish financial system is the most solid across the world”. One year later, the 
economic minister Elena Salgado reassured the country by saying that “the worst is 
behind us”. 
Such initial optimism, coupled with the recurrent references to the green shoots of the 
Spanish economy and the security of not having to change the welfare state faded on 
 Encuesta de población activa, Serie histórica. Available at: http://www.ine.es/prensa/epa_tabla.htm 15
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the 12th of May 2010, when President Zapatero announced in the congress the need to 
make cuts in the social program due to the growing of the public deficit.   The 16
Congress gathered to be briefed on the results of the emergency Eurogroup meeting 
held on the 7th of May following the official bailout request by the Greek government 
on April 23. After that meeting, Chancellor Merkel stated that the most important 
result was the compromise with Spain and Portugal, which agreed to cut their public 
expenditure. Only in October 2013, Zapatero acknowledged the German pressure on 
cuts and their suggestion to ask for a rescue.  
According to scholars such as Bilbao, that meeting changed the course of the Euro 
crisis management. Not only were the financial rescue packages of the affected 
countries agreed, but also the ECB changed its strategy for a more proactive stance: 
“once the mechanisms of financial stability are created, we need to insist on fiscal 
discipline, structural reforms which are the basis for an improved governance which 
can culminate in the new scheme of financial supervision” (Bilbao, 2012). 
Nevertheless, months later, in the German-Spanish summit held in February 2011, 
Merkel supported the reforms inaugurated by the socialist government to the point 
that she denied the need for a financial rescue for the country, since in her opinion 
“Spain was on the right track” (Segovia, Cruz 2011). However, the Spanish economic 
situation was not recovering at all.  
In May 2011 the country officially re-entered recession, with the agency Moody’s 
downgrading 16 Spanish banks. It was in this context that the socialist government 
decided to reform the Spanish Constitution to introduce the controversial German 
“golden rule” that puts significant strain on government expenditure and almost 
forbids public structural deficits as required by Chancellor Merkel and ECB President 
Trichet. Thus, debt payment would have full priority over any other kind of 
expenditure. This measure produced strong debates in the Spanish left. Despite the 
content, which is, as mentioned above a German rule (thus a clear German influence), 
the process through which it was approved is also controversial. Interestingly enough, 
the reform was the result of a joint proposal of the socialist and the popular, by 
emergency decree. The text was submitted on the 26th of August, - the same day of the 
 Official minutes. Available http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L9/CONG/DS/PL/PL_162.PDF16
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dissolution of the chambers of the IX legislature. Indeed, Zapatero had announced the 
he would anticipate the electoral process foreseen in March 2012, hoping that the new 
elections would project “political and economic certainty” and allow the new 
executive to start in January.  
The constitutional change was finally agreed on the 27th of September(Constitución 
Española, 15210 – Reforma de artículo 135) , after only a month – with no public 
debate on the matter.  
The national elections held on the 20th of November 2011 saw a change in the 
government, with the conservatives led by Mariano Rajoy gaining an absolute 
majority. After the usual traditional visit to Morocco at the beginning of the mandate, 
Rajoy chose Germany as the first government foreign visit on the 26th of January 
2012, a few days before his first EU Council summit. The government Vice-President 
Soraya Sáenz Santamaría defined the visit as “pivotal for the Spanish finances”.  
During the press conference held in Berlin, Rajoy stated that the Spanish government 
would put in place an economic policy that was coherent with what would be 
discussed in the EU Council: “Our priorities are achieving budgetary discipline, 
containing public deficit and proceeding with the structural reforms”. For her part, 
Merkel suggested the German model, as the one Spain should follow.  
In February and April 2012 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) visited Spain in 
order to draft a report on the situation of the financial sector in the country. The report 
published in June 2012 was clear: Spain needed a European bailout to recapitalize its 
banking sector. Thus, on the 20th of July Spain signed the first Memorandum of 
Understanding with the so-called Troika (ECB, EC and IMF), which would grant the 
country 100 billion in exchange for 32 conditions and the obligation to radically 
reform its economic system within 3 months. The agreement would come into effect 
at the end of 2012, with the injection of 40 billion by the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM).  However, the bailout was conditional on the ratification of the 17
Fiscal Compact, the intergovernmental treaty signed on the 2nd of March 2012 and 
ratified by Spain on the 21st of June of the same year. 
 The Spanish bailout differs from the Greek, Portuguese and Irish, because it only comes from the 17
Eurozone countries (and some contributions of the UK) without the involvement of the IMF. It only 
concerned the banking sector and not the government directly. 
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4.5: Main findings 
As shown in the analysis of the Spanish and Italian cases, the inclusion of the debt 
brake law, also known as the golden rule, in their Constitution is a clear sign of 
German influence. The change in the government in Italy and Spain happened 
through critical financial conditions, which diminished the leverage that the previous 
government of Zapatero and Berlusconi had in the negotiations, thus Germany’s 
position of dominance was enhanced by the political weakness of the countries.  
Moreover, the work of two scholars – Arroyo and Giménez- is particularly interesting 
in this context as they explore the concept of the constitutionalisation of the economic 
crisis. Through a comparative case study they explored the introduction of the golden 
rule in Germany and Italy and the open debate in France. They underline that the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union, the so-called Fiscal Compact had a “German imprint” and the content is 
essentially similar to the reform of Basic Law introduced in 2009 (Arroyo Gil, 
Giménez Sánchez, 2013). Furthermore, the authors focus on the fact that in a country 
like Italy - where even minimal matters attract media attention –there was total silence 
on the reform, despite its extraordinary relevance and dramatic consequences. The 
conclusions of the authors are particularly relevant: in Germany, the constitutional 
change was preceded by a lengthy and profound debate which led to the usual 
consensus; whereas in Italy and Spain, the debate was absent, which signals to the 
fact that the change was largely imposed rather than sought by the countries 
themselves.   
Arguably, Germany did not seek to exert power voluntarily, but it acted as the 
ultimate supervisory body in the management of the crisis, expecting other countries 
to apply the same ordoliberal strategy that Germany itself had used to recover from 
the reunification shock. Nonetheless, the bulk of the literature on this topic consists of 
scholars who claim that the Euro crisis put Germany in the frontline because it was 
driven more by national interests than collective. Thus, intergovernmentalism as 
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invoked by Merkel has been the only possible solution, also considering the high 
sensitivity of the issues of national sovereignty. We can thus conclude that during the 
euro crisis, Germany enjoyed its position of advantage since France was significantly 
weakened; institutional power exerted along with France was thus substituted by 
structural power due to its economic means and its status as creditor.  
It is worth mentioning an opposite opinion on the matter, provided by study of 
Epstein and Rhodes which focused on the process leading to the creation of the 
banking union, which argues that German power was challenged by Italy and Spain in 
the EU summit of 28-29 June 2012, which was held in deep-crisis mode; the EU 
leaders agreed on two measures aimed at relaxing the bond markets, especially in 
Italy and Spain. Such measures would allow direct recapitalisation of banks, in order 
to “break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns” (Euro Area summit 
statement, 29 June 2012). This summit was particularly important because it set the 
conditions to form the Banking Union. The negotiations ahead of the summit were as 18
difficult as the summit itself, characterised by rising tensions between MS’s 
governments so far so that the media depicted the event as a stand-off between Italy 
and Spain on one side and Germany on the other (Emmanouilidis, 2012). According 
to the work of the two authors, this episode is highly significant because it shows the 
significant constraints in which Germany incurs at EU level when it tries to exert its 
power. On one hand, the fact that the German government supported the creation of 
SSM can be seen as a small victory for the peripheral MS and a reshape of German 
power; on the other hand, this episode can be seen as the fact that Germany agreed to 
concede on this for the stability of the entire euro area.  
The same process can be observed in the establishment of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) in 2012, which replaced the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) created in June 2010. According to a number of scholars, Merkel gave in 
under the condition that MS signed the Fiscal Compact, the intergovernmental treaty 
that enshrines budget discipline into national law. The creation of these two programs 
can be seen as a power-loss for the German position, traditionally contrary to bailouts 
 The EC made the proposal “Roadmap towards a Banking Union” in September 2012. The plan was 18
formally embraced one month later by the EU summit in mid-October. 
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a priori because it is in breach with the treaties. However, Germany managed to make 
the rescue conditional on the implementation of structural reforms, which is in line 
with the ordoliberal standpoint, because the ultimate responsibility lies with the 
countries in disarray – providing the periphery with the help to help itself (Hillebrand, 
2015).   
5: Case 2 - The refugee crisis 
5.1: The context -2015: significant changes at EU level  
While the Eurozone crisis threatened the economic and political stability of the EU as 
a whole, another worrisome emergency loomed over the continent: the huge influx of 
asylum seekers coming from Asia, Africa and the Western Balkans. Despite migration 
being national competence, the current EU common asylum policy is based on the 
Dublin regulation, which assigns the responsibility for processing the asylum 
application to the first country in which refugees arrive. Until 2015, Italy was the 
most affected country, as the Mediterranean Sea was the most popular route.  
After one of the many shipwrecks in October 2013, the Italian government launched a 
major military-supported humanitarian and border control operation called “Mare 
Nostrum”, which was to operate in the Italian, Maltese and Libyan ‘Search and 
Rescue’ (SAR) zones, under the authority of the Italian Navy. The initiative was 
effective but costly, thus, Italy, which was under considerable political pressure at 
national level, requested additional funds from the other EU MS but none of them 
offered support.  
According to a provisional report of the UNHCR, in the first half of 2015 more than 
137.000 migrants arrived to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea; an increase of 
83% in comparison with the same period of the previous year, 2014. Beyond the 
numbers, there was one new trend: the so-called Eastern Mediterranean Route became 
the new gateway, as a result of the increase in asylum-seekers from Syria.  
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In the spring of 2015, it became clear that the common asylum system was 
significantly flawed and it put an excessive burden on those States close to the 
external border, such as Italy and Greece – which, among other things, had been 
dramatically weakened by the Euro crisis. 
The turning point was on 19 April 2015, when another boat carrying at least 800 
people from North Africa sank in the Sicilian channel; only 27 survived. Similar to 
the Eurozone havoc, the institutions created to support the Common European 
Asylum System were not sufficient to manage such a crisis, partly due to the 
reluctance of MS to hand over their autonomy in the area to supranational institutions. 
Thus, on the 23rd of April an emergency meeting of the European Council was held; 
the EU leaders agreed on strengthening their presence at sea – by allocating more 
assets within the mandate of FRONTEX, fighting human trafficking and bringing the 
issue to the African Union in order to find a solution which could tackle the problem 
at its core. The greatest innovation, as reported in the statement, can be seen in the 
part that concerns “reinforcing internal solidarity and responsibility”: for the first 
time, EU leaders envisaged the possibility of “organising emergency relocation 
between all MS on a voluntary basis” and a “voluntary pilot project on resettlement 
across the EU”, in order to alleviate the burden for frontline MS (European Council, 
2015). One month later, on the 13th of May the EC revealed its Agenda on Migration. 
The first part reflects the need for immediate measures to deal with emergencies and 
tackle smuggling, while the second part explores the possibility for the EC to trigger 
the emergency response system envisaged in Art. 78(3) of the TFEU. The proposal 
included a “temporary distribution scheme for those persons in need of protection to 
ensure a fair and balanced participation of all MS […] a redistribution key based on 
criteria such as GDP (40%), size of population (40%), unemployment rate (10%) and 
past numbers of spontaneous asylum seekers (10%) […] This step will be the 
precursor of a lasting solution (EC, 2015). Furthermore, in its Agenda the EC 
recognised the shortcomings of the Dublin system in the fact that in 2014 only five 
MS out of 28 dealt with 72% of the asylum applications. The fact that the EC invited 
the MS to make full use of the Dublin system and its derogations (concerning family 
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reunification and humanitarian clauses) is especially significant – that will be the case 
of Germany at the end of August of the same year.  
At the end of May, the EC published its proposal with the first implementation 
measures, which among other issues such as guidelines for MS to take fingerprints 
and tackling the problem of smugglers, it outlined concrete action concerning 
relocation and resettlement. It was agreed to relocate 40 000 Syrian and Eritrean 
nationals in need of international protection that arrived in either Italy or Greece after 
15 April 2015 or that arrived after the mechanism would be launched. The scheme 
would be temporary (two years) and the number of refugees to allocate on each MS 
would depend on the “distribution key” mentioned in the Agenda. Moreover, the MS 
would receive €6,000 for each person relocated on their territory (EC, 2015). The 
proposal also stated that the EC had adopted a Recommendation on a temporary 
Resettlement scheme that would concern 20 000 people from outside the EU, in clear 
need of international protection as identified by the UNHCR.  
On the 9th of July 2015, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) ministers held an informal 
meeting in Luxembourg and discussed migration issues. In the press conference held 
after the meeting, Luxembourg’s Minister of Immigration and Asylum Jean Asselborn 
stated that the MS managed to agree on the resettlement of 20,000 persons in the EU 
(while the ministers did not reach a conclusion on the relocation of asylum seekers in 
the EU proposed by the EC in May). The JHA held another Council meeting on the 
20th of July, where a provisional agreement was reached on the topic of relocation 
and the representatives of MS committed to relocate 32 256 persons out of 40,000 
from Italy and Greece. From the statement given by the MS, the position of the 
traditional Franco -German axis was clear: solidarity and responsibility were closely 19
interlinked, thus all the MS should take part in both the resettlement and the 
relocation scheme (meeting of the Council of the European Union JHA, 2015, p5). 
Whereas, the Visegrad Countries (V4) stressed that the scheme was voluntary, 
temporary and should not plan to change the asylum system in the long term (in 
particular, Czech Republic asked for compliance with the proportionality principle).  
 It should be noted that France’s position was not favorable at the beginning. Indeed, President 19
Hollande defined the quotas system as 
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After the agreement reached on the 20th of July 2015, the refugee crisis in the Central 
and Eastern Mediterranean had significantly intensified, thus the EC’s proposal for a 
Council decision published on the 9th of September took into account the pressures 
that Hungary was facing by including the country in the emergency relocation scheme 
along with Italy and Greece. The number of persons in need of relocation from the 
frontline States became 120,000 (54,000 from Hungary). One day after the second 
package of the EC, the spokesperson of the Hungarian government stated that it 
would not take part into the relocation scheme nor would it accept the help from the 
EU, judged as only “superficial” (Zalan, 2015).  
In the meeting held by the JHA Council on the 14th of September, the representatives 
formally agreed to relocate 40,000 refugees (as drafted in Luxembourg on the 20th of 
July), whereas the additional relocation of 120,000 was only “agreed in 
principle” (JHA Council, 2015). After a week of heated debate, the JHA Council 
resumed on the 22 of September, a historical moment: the Decision establishing 
provisional measures, namely the relocation of 120,000 refugees from Italy and 
Greece was adopted by qualified majority voting. Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania 
and Slovakia voted against, while Finland abstained.  Usually QMV  is casted for 20 21
less controversial measures, while consensus (unanimity) is preferred for such a 
sensitive policy change. Not only has the use of QMV had negative consequences for 
the implementation of the scheme, but it has created a divisive atmosphere in the 
whole EU, the one between East and West, the one between the solidarity-centred 
states and the more reluctant states (Radu, 2016). 
5.2: The situation in Germany  
As mentioned above, 2015 was a pivotal year for Europe and especially for Germany. 
Migratory flows heading to the European subcontinents increased as the lengthy and 
 Abstention under QMV counts as a vote against. 20
 Some scholars define it as the “nuclear weapon” of the Big Members. 21
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bitter war in Syria continued to deteriorate. Germany experienced a sharp increase in 
the number of asylum applications to a historical peak of 441,900 persons - 155% 
more in comparison to 2014  (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2015). The 22
country has a mandatory quota-system based on a formula, the so-called Königstein 
key, which is calculated every year and is based on tax revenue and population 
number (of the previous year). The German states (Länder) are obliged to take the 
percentage of refugees and asylum-seekers that they are assigned.  23
In line with the EC’s Agenda of migration, the German government continued to 
respect the asylum procedure based on the Dublin regulation and, on the 21st of 
August of 2015, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) 
issued instructions halting the Dublin procedure for Syrian nationals (Dernbach, 
2015). By using the “sovereignty clause” envisaged in art.17 of the Regulation 
604/2013  – usually known as the Dublin regulation – Germany formally voluntarily 24
became the MS responsible for processing claims from Syrians.  
At the beginning of September, after the protests held in the train station of Keleti in 
Budapest, where the asylum seekers were prevented by the Hungarian police to board 
trains for West Europe (mainly Germany and Austria), Chancellor Merkel reiterated in 
an interview that a “strong, economically healthy country such as Germany has to do 
what is necessary for the asylum seekers”. Moreover, she stated that Europe is based 
on common values, and offering help to those in need of protection is part of those 
values too. “I am confident that Europe will meet the challenge,” said the Chancellor, 
who wished for a European response to the refugee-crisis.  
However, the increase in the number of asylum seekers soon revealed to be a major 
challenge for the authorities, especially at local level in terms of registration, 
accommodation and assistance for the newcomers. In order to facilitate the 
 It should be noted that the number of asylum seekers was significantly higher than the number of 22
asylum-applications. 
 http://www.bamf.de/EN/Service/Left/Glossary/_function/glossar.html?lv3=1504234&lv2=583242623
 Each MS may decide to examine an application for international protection […] even if such 24
examination is not its responsibility under the criteria laid down in this regulation. The MS that decides 
to examine an application for international protection shall become the responsible and shall assume 
the obligations associated with that responsibility […] it shall inform the MS previously responsible to 
take charge of the applicant. 
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registration procedure, Germany introduced temporary border controls on the 
Austrian border on 13 September 2015.  The political debate also started to grow 25
over the Merkel’s “open arms policy”, with representatives from her coalition partners 
from the Christian Social Union (CSU) (along with some exponents of CDU) and 
especially the Bavarian government questioning whether the crisis should be dealt 
with national measures such as permanent border control (BAMF, 2016) as other MS 
had not shown willingness to cooperate. Even after the agreed relocation of 120,000 
refugees on September 22 - despite only a few MS openly opposed the EC’s 
relocation scheme - the other big MS were not pushing for a swift implementation of 
the scheme backed by the German government  (Janning, 2016).  26
After the Council Decision of the 22nd of September, Chancellor Merkel held a speech 
of the 7th October 2015 in Strasbourg, which was very different from the speech in 
Bruges of 2010, where she called for individual responsibility and the Union method, 
with a strong consensus between the MS and their parliaments. In Strasbourg she 
stressed the importance of solidarity and shared responsibility: “In the refugee crisis 
we must not give in to the temptation to fall back on national government action. On 
the contrary, what we need now is more Europe […] only together will Europe 
succeed in mitigating the root causes of displacement worldwide. Only together will 
we succeed in combating criminal human trafficking […] and protecting our external 
borders with jointly operated hotspots and manage not to jeopardize our internally 
border-less Europe”.  
As Radu explains in her research (based on the words of Habermas), the refugee crisis 
represents a return of the politicians’ public defence of the supranational nature of the 
European project: “the refugee crisis is a dramatic challenge for a much closer sense 
of cooperation and solidarity than any European nations, even those tied up to one 
another in the currency union, have so far managed to achieve” (Habermas, 2015). 
 By the end of 2015 6 States in total – Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway and Sweden had 25
reinstalled border control as envisaged in Ch. III “Temporary reintroduction of border controls at the 
internal border” of the Schengen Border Code.
 In 1994, during the German Presidency of the Council, the government tried to push a similar 26
scheme for the relocation of refugees based on criteria of GDP, population and size of the territory. 
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5.3:The case of Hungary 
Arguably, the Hungarian attitude towards the refugee crisis can be considered as the 
antithesis to the open-door German policy. One day after the emergency meeting of 
the 23 April 2015 in the EU council to discuss the Mediterranean disaster, the centre-
right Hungarian government led by Fidesz PM Viktor Orban announced the launch of 
national consultation on immigration, with 12-point questionnaire to be sent to the 
Hungarian citizens over 18.  The “small-scale manifesto” was accompanied by a 27
letter, in which the government carefully avoided using the word refugees, 
channelling the idea that those arriving to Hungary were not seeking protection, but 
instead they were illegal economic migrants trying to exploit the welfare system and 
“steal their jobs” (Györi, 2016). The questionnaire also established a biased link 
between immigration and security threats, driving the citizens with an idea that seems 
to be confirmed by the speech held by Orban on the 28th of April, where he stated that 
he would stop at nothing to protect its citizens, even considering the idea of 
reintroducing death penalty.   28
Nevertheless, the political communication centred on the fact that “illegal migrants” 
were reaching Hungary to seek employment was misleading and not based on facts; 
indeed, because of its position as a strategic corridor between Serbia and Austria, the 
country became the entrance through the Schengen area, but only a transit zone for 
people seeking for asylum elsewhere in Europe, mainly Germany. According to the 
data of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in 2015 Hungary was the 
second EU country (after Greece) with the highest number of irregular migrants at its 
external border (411,515 crossings) (IOM, 2016). When the situation deteriorated 
 The Hungarian government keeps making use of this “direct democracy”. Another consultation is as 27
recent as April 2017; the so called “Stop Brussels’ consultation has been heavily criticized by the EC, 
which has responded to the 6 issues outlined in the Hungarian campaign with “hard facts”. Answer 
available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/stop-brussels-european-commission-
responds-hungarian-national-consultation_en
 The EP adopted a resolution on the 10/06/2015 on the situation of Hungary, warning that a serious 28
breach of Art. 2 TEU by a MS would trigger the Art. 7 procedures, namely a formal warning and the 
possibility of imposing sanctions as well as suspending voting rights. 
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during the summer 2015 the number of registered arrivals in Hungary was around 
1500 persons per day. On 17 June 2015, the Hungarian government approved a 
decision in which it ordered the construction of a 175 km long and 4 m high 
temporary border control fence along the Hungarian-Serbian border (Hungarian 
Ministry of Interior, 2015), which was accepted by the Parliament on the 6th of July. 
According to the Ministry of Interior, not only was the measure necessary for 
Hungary itself but “also with a view to the best interests of the rest of the Schengen 
countries” (Ministry of Interior, 2015). The adoption of the physical measure was 
accompanied by a series of legislative acts aimed at tackling illegal migration, which 
made de facto impossible for migrants to reach the country; these included an 
amendment of the Asylum law in which the government inscribed Serbia, Macedonia 
and EU MS (including Greece) as safe third countries (of origin and of transit). 
Thanks to this amendment, asylum applications by people transiting through from 
these countries could be sent back through a faster procedure.  
The tough measures continued to raise concerns at EU level, but the Hungarian 
government justified them as necessary to protect the interests of the Hungarian 
citizens. On one side of the political spectrum, Chancellor Merkel was defending the 
moral obligation towards people in need of protection; whilst on the other, there was 
PM Orban defending the moral obligation towards the protection of Hungary first and 
then Europe. At that point it is important to note one significant aspect that was 
recurrent in his speeches: “the refugee crisis is not a European problem, it is a 
German problem”.  Indeed, PM Orban at the beginning of September recognised that 29
the illegal migrants were not seeking to stay in Hungary but their objective was to 
reach other Western countries, Germany in particular; this was the main reason why, 
according to Orban, the mandatory system of quotas would not work. The rhetoric 
changed after Merkel’s open door policy resulted in the reinstallation of border 
control with Austria because of the issues arisen with the reception systems and the 
JHA Council Decision of September 22, in which Hungary voted against the 
relocation of refugees. One day after that historical agreement, Orban attended two 
important meetings, one in Bavaria and the other one in Brussels.  
 Press conference of Orban and EP President Schulz, 4 September 2015. 29
!  32
Just a few hours ahead of the informal summit with the other European heads of state 
and government, Orban met CSU representatives in the Bavarian city of Bamberg and 
made one of the most important statements throughout the crisis: “if Germany decides 
to accept mass immigration, other countries are not obliged to do the same”.  
The meeting is particularly important because CSU leader Horst Seehofer had deeply 
criticized Chancellor Merkel open door policy as a unilateral action without 
consulting the rest of the coalition government. During the press conference held after 
the meeting, President Seehofer thanked PM Orban for protecting the Bavarian 
southern borders. The importance of the meeting can be seen in a few aspects: despite 
the agreed relocation of refugees was seen as a victory for Berlin, the fact that the 
party in coalition with Merkel invited one of the most outspoken politicians against 
the quotas and Germany’s role in the crisis, undermines the Chancellor authority. 
Moreover, Orban saw Merkel’s recurrent pledge to the moral obligation towards 
saving refugees as “moral imperialism”, another manner to convince the rest of 
Europe to follow, first by appealing to the shared values of solidarity between MS and 
then by using the “weapon” of QMV in the Council, thanks to its voting weight. At 
the informal Heads of State and Governments’ summit held in Brussels on the same 
day, PM Orban outlined his six-point plan for tackling the migration crisis, which was 
an antithesis of the burden-sharing system advocated by Chancellor Merkel. In 
contrast to the quota system, he suggested that if the problem could not be addressed 
at the core (namely ending the war in Syria, etc.), it should be dealt with at the border. 
In this sense, if Greece or other frontline MS could not protect their external borders, 
other MS should be in charge of doing so. “This way the problem would be tackled 
there and not re-directed at the heart of Europe,” said Orban in his speech addressing 
the Hungarian Parliament a few days before the summit.  Apart from encouraging 30
Greece to hand over the protection of its borders to other states that were more 
“prepared to do so”, the six-point plan suggested to make a clear division between 
refugees and economic migrants at the border itself, thus before registration, 
increasing the number of funds for emergencies and agreeing on a list of safe third 
 It is Hungary’s historic and moral obligation to protect Europe. Available at http://www.kormany.hu/30
en/the-prime-minister/news/it-is-hungary-s-historic-and-moral-obligation-to-protect-europe 
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countries at European level. Moreover, he suggested that other countries such as 
Turkey and even Russia should be treated as key partners in resolving the crisis. 
Lastly, his plan envisaged quotas- based on the logic through which the CDU had 
already developed in Europe – but only at global level.  31
PM Orban failed to push the plan in the informal summit, and according to the final 
statement, progress was only made towards increasing the funds for aid agencies and 
opening the dialogue with Turkey (European Council, 2015). Furthermore, the 
meeting was held in a context of tensions and deep resentment after the Decision on 
the quota-system resulted in a more divided Union, with countries such as Slovakia 
and Czech Republic threatening to take the issue to court (Traynor, 2015).     
The migration issue was resumed at the European Council summit held in October, 
where it soon became clear that the relocation of refugees throughout the EU alone 
would not suffice to tackle the crisis, thus the European heads of state or government 
set out the first guidelines for the implementation of a joint EU-Turkey action. 
At the end of 2015, it became clear that the refugee crisis had pitted leaders against 
each other, and that the divisions arisen between the MS risked undermining the 
European project as a whole.  
While Merkel’s open arms policy was praised internationally as a great act of 
humanity, Orban’s closure has been deeply criticized. The government’s illiberal, fear-
mongering and anti-democratic turn has generated a number of reactions in the past 
two years. Nonetheless, Fidesz’s anti-immigration discourse has been one of the most 
successful in Europe. The refugee crisis has generated a polarised EU: on one side 
Chancellor Merkel defending European values of solidarity and humanity, on the 
other PM Orban defending the European heritage of Christianity against Islamism. 
Orban and his anti-immigration discourse along with criticism towards Germany’s 
attempt at leading the EU found a powerful ally in the biggest of the V4 countries, 
Poland, whose case will be examined in the next section.  
 Orban posted the video of the six-point plan in his Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/31
orbanviktor/videos/10153593798006093/
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5. 4: The case of Poland 
Until 2015, the issue of migration rarely made headlines in Poland. With its 
geographical position and economic status as labour exporter rather than a destination 
for migrants seeking jobs , the general public concern over immigration was only 7% 32
compared to the European average of 16% (Györi, 2016). In 2015, 12,211 persons 
sought asylum in Poland, with an increase by 49% in comparison with 2014, with 
Syrian and Iraqi refugees only accounting for a small part (295 and 62 respectively).   33
Unlike its Hungarian Visegrad partner, the government, led by the centre-right Civic 
Platform (PO) did not take a hard stance on the refugees in general; indeed PM Ewa 
Kopacz said on the 26th of May of 2015 that Poland would welcome 60 Syrian 
Christian families “for a start”. One day later, the EC would publish the first – 
temporary  - measures under the European Agenda on Migration, namely the 34
proposal for a Council Decision to activate an emergency relocation of 40,000 
persons in need, 24,000 from Italy and 16,000 from Greece. As mentioned above, 
during the JHA Council held in Luxembourg on the 10th of July no agreement was 
reached on the relocation of 40,000 refugees from Italy and Greece, whereas the MS 
advanced the decision on the resettlement scheme recommended by the EC. Poland 
thus agreed to accept 2000 refugees under the resettlement scheme - but not the 
relocation. Despite the government’s reluctance towards quotas, in September PM 
Kopacz reiterated, "Poland cannot afford to accept economic migrants, but it is the 
biggest central European economy's duty to accept refugees fleeing wars". In her 
speech, she remembered the solidarity expressed by EU partners when Poland was 
dealing with the Ukrainian refugees, thus Poland will "help share the 
burden"(Goclowski, 2015). 
It should be noted that the PO was under considerable pressure because its main 
political figure and former PM was the European Council President, Donald Tusk, 
 After entering the EU in 2004, the country registered one of the biggest emigration flows, becoming 32
one of the largest exporters of labour within the Union. It is still considered as a gateway to the Western 
countries. 
 The refugee status was granted to 203 Syrian citizens and to 24 Iraqis. Sources available at https://33
emn.gov.pl/ese/news/14150,Migration-to-Poland-in-2015-main-tendencies.html?search=5398 
 The duration of the measures was 24 months after the adoption of the Council Decision.  34
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thus including his country in the European Agenda on Migration was seen as a 
mandatory objective to signal a strong commitment from both the EU Institutions and 
the MS. At the same time, Poland was the biggest country in the V4, and it could not 
afford disagreement with its closest partners, especially Hungary. Lastly, the PO could 
not ignore the considerable anti-refugee sentiment growing  in the population in view 35
of the Parliamentary elections of October 2015; especially after the opposition party 
Law and Justice (PiS) had already won the Presidential elections held in May.   
During a special session held in the Polish Parliament to discuss refugee crisis, 
European solidarity and immigration on September 16, the leader of PiS  Jarosław 36
Kaczynski denounced the decision of the PO government to accept refugees as a 
violation of the constitution, the country’s sovereignty and the citizens’ rights. 
According to the leader, the reason why accepting refugees would pose a threat to the 
country was that not only will they not abide to the national customs and traditions, 
but they would also seek to impose their own values on the Polish society, “in a fierce 
way”. This way of thinking is very similar to Hungarian PM Orban’s view on 
refugees: both leaders attempt to channel the idea that all refugees were Muslim and 
their culture was incompatible with the Christian values that characterized Europe’s 
identity. Moreover, the use of the word “security threat” is recurrent, as they try to 
establish a fear-mongering environment that pits citizens against different cultures. In 
this sense, Kaczynski made a number of examples of countries that have accepted 
migration and now they are confronted with “areas in which the Sharia law was being 
implemented”: Italy, France, Sweden and even Germany. The leader went further by 
stating that the accepting all kinds of refugees will lead to the fall of European 
civilisation. The speech continued with the usual remark about differentiation 
between refugees and economic migrants: according to Kaczynski, the latter are 
attracted by one country, Germany, thus PM Orban was right to state that it is their 
problem, not a European one. Lastly, another reference to Germany is expressed when 
 Protests broke in several Polish cities during the summer 2015. Overall, the slogans attacked the ties 35
between refugees and Islam and terrorism. Some protesters threatened to do to the refugees what the 
Nazis did with Jews. 
 PiS is a political party that rejects deeper integration. Strongly focused on national culture and 36
shared values between the central and eastern European states, in the past it used to recognise the 
hegemony of big States such as Germany or Russia. 
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the leader discusses the subsidies received by the EU: “they pay us for the fact that we 
give away our capability to decide on our own matters to those biggest, strongest MS 
with the power to decide […] This power has huge economic value and political 
consequences, but we do have the right to protect our sovereignty” (Kaczynski, 
2015).  37
Despite the rise of domestic concerns over immigration, the PO government decided 
to go against its V4 allies during the JHA Council meeting of September 22 and voted 
for the relocation mechanism of refugees from Italy and Greece. However, the likely 
successor of Kopacz, Beata Szydło from PiS, denounced the decision as a scandal, 
saying her government would reverse it. Indeed, in the Parliamentary elections held at 
the end of October, PiS won 37.6% of the votes and became the first Party in 26 years 
of democracy in Poland, which did not have to make a coalition in order to form the 
government.   
In the first month of its mandate, the PiS government continued to criticize the 
decision of the PO to take 7,000 refugees, but Foreign Minister Witold 
Waszczykowski stated that his country would respect the deal, although “its legality 
had to be questioned”. However, the real breaking point was the terror attack of Paris 
on November 13, where 130 people died. One day after the attack, deputy Foreign 
Minister Konrad Szymanski said, “the agreement on quotas was dead”. While 
German Interior Minister De Maziere urged leaders not to draw comparisons between 
refugees and the deadly terror attacks, PM Szydło officially announced the decision of 
not accepting any quotas after Paris, in a press conference with a new, important 
detail: the EU flag had been removed.  
PM Szydło’s policy towards refugees’ quotas contributed to the repositioning of 
Poland in line with its V4 partners, which were once the most pro-European countries 
and now seemed to be distancing themselves from the original project. The V4’s 
attitude towards the refugee crisis has brought to light the differences between Eastern 
and Western values, between those in favour of deeper integration and those who 
advocate the importance of nation states, which also contributed to the rise of talks 
about “multi-speed Europe”. Moreover, the attitude shown by the new Polish 
 Speech available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6NlRstWinSU37
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government represents an abrupt change to the German-Polish relations as a whole. 
The countries ‘reconciliation has in fact been one of the pillars that have allowed 
stability after enlargement (Nougayrède, 2016).  
5.5: Germany and Central Europe 
During the refugee crisis, the relations between Germany and Central Europe have 
significantly weakened. As early as in 2006, Michael Baun examined the prospect of 
German influence in central Europe after the end of the Cold War, and concluded that 
only from an economic standpoint can Germany be said to exert power in the region. 
The absence of significant alternatives contributed to the development of this general 
view. During the process of central Europe’s integration into the EU - expert Jan 
Cienski states that Germany essentially assumed the role of Moscow after the collapse 
of Communism - although the relation was one of a benign kind.  Nonetheless, the 38
political influence deriving from economic dominance in the area seems to have 
ended during the refugee crisis. The significant economic structural power that gave 
Germany the economic leverage towards Southern countries during the Eurozone 
crisis did not prove useful during the refugee emergency, and especially towards non-
Eurozone countries. Thus, in this case, Germany’s attempt to use its power to shape 
the countries’ response to the humanitarian crisis proved unsuccessful and it 
demonstrates once again that structural power does not translate into productive 
power.  
Lastly, it is important to notice that not only has the issue of migration brought to light 
the failure of Germany in providing leadership in areas that are not related to the 
EMU, but also it has raised the issue of the differences between East and West and to 
what extent has the EU successfully managed to integrate after the Enlargement in 
1998-2002. After Hungary, Poland is the second of the Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries that raised fears of an authoritarian backslide in the region. Both 
 By recognising the benefits of new markets and lower production costs, a number of German 38
companies chose to relocate in the Visegrad countries. Germany is indeed the main foreign investor in 
the area, not only in the automotive sector, but also in the chemical industry, retail and real estate. 
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countries were long viewed as role models with regard to their political and economic 
transformation from communism (or the so-called “real existing socialism” as 
political purists would have it) to democracies. 
6: Conclusions  
The aim of the paper was to assess whether Germany had played a role in shaping the 
EU countries’ response in times of crisis. The evaluation of the Eurozone crisis and 
the Refugee crisis has demonstrated that Germany was able to do so in the area of 
EMU but not in that of JHA. During the Euro crisis it was clear that due to its 
economic means, the country bestowed itself with a responsibility to act with the 
objective to save the fate of the Eurozone as a whole. The most emblematic case 
through which such power was exerted occurred by pressuring EU MS such as Italy 
and Spain to enshrine budgetary discipline into their Constitution and in general by 
promoting the German ordoliberal model as the successful formula to recover from 
the crisis.  
Conversely, the leading role taken by Germany during the Refugee crisis did not 
prove successful with Eastern countries that also happened to be outside the 
Eurozone. Keeping in mind the theoretical framework provided by the taxonomy of 
power by Barnett and Duvall, which identifies connections between the different 
forms, we can conclude that Germany’s structural power did not translate into 
productive power, as its attempt to implement the burden-sharing system (already in 
place in Germany) through the EU institutions, did not succeed, but rather 
deteriorated MS relations and generated a situation of lack of cooperation and 
solidarity that has significantly undermined the European project.  
Thus, to answer the research question, we can conclude that Germany, despite 
enjoying a significant amount of institutional and structural power, cannot be 
characterised as a hegemonic leader in Europe because it failed to produce diffuse 
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social practices and terms of action that are typical of actors who exert productive 
power. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that a different result might have been 
reached through the analysis of more case studies, the focus on more policy areas or 
the use of a different theoretical framework.  
As of the relevance of the study, it can be observed in the current state of play of 
European politics. The Eurostat data extracted in April 2018 has shown 
unemployment rates in the Eurozone are down to 8,5%, which is the lowest rate 
recorded since December 2008 (Eurostat, 2018). On the 22nd of June 2018, Eurogroup 
President Mario Centeno announced that after Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus, 
Greece will soon be “graduating” from its Economic Adjustment Programme 
(Eurogroup, 2018). Although the EU seems to have left the Eurozone crisis behind, 
the Refugee crisis is still high on both the EU and national agendas. The reform of the 
Dublin system has been on the negotiating tables of the European legislators since 
2016, without much success. On 24th June 2018, an informal summit was held in 
Brussels at the German Chancellor’s request, in order to find a compromise ahead of 
the European Council Meeting of 28-29 June. Chancellor Merkel’s request to hold 
talks with European counterparts was the consequence of the deterioration of the 
relations between her coalition partners from the CSU. Indeed, as mentioned above, 
her open door policy towards refugees significantly undermined her support at 
domestic level. At the 2017 German elections held in September, her party saw the 
biggest drop in support since 1949, a consequence that most scholars attribute to her 
unilateral decision during the Refugee crisis.  
As Machiavelli states, crises can either lead to accumulation of power, or to its 
decline. Germany’s economic advantage over other EU countries led to the 
accumulation of power during the Eurozone crisis – a power that the country 
considered a responsibility to act during the Refugee crisis. Scholars have considered 
this as a German attempt to both actively seek power and become a model within the 
EU. As this paper has claimed, Germany’s structural power in economic areas does 
not translate into the political and productive power, necessary to become the 
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European leader. The refugee crisis has indeed demonstrated that there is no 
leadership if no one follows.  
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